AMNA NAWAZ: Now to parse the statements, the motivations, and the potential outcomes of this latest attempt to end the war, we're again joined by two of our Iran watchers.

Alan Eyre worked in the State Department and was a senior member of the Obama administration's negotiating team for the 2015 Iran nuclear deal.

He's now at the Middle East Institute.

And Miad Maleki was born and raised in Iran.

Until last year, he was the associate director for sanctioned Targeting in the U.S.

Treasury Department with a focus on Iran.

He's now a senior fellow at the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies.

And welcome back to you both.

Alan, I'll start with you.

You heard Liz report Iran and the U.S.

both saying they are close to an agreement.

What one side says is in the deal is not what the other side is saying.

And each blames the other for misrepresenting the deal.

What is going on here, in your view?

ALAN EYRE, Middle East Institute: Again, we're close to a deal.

We've been close to a deal many times, but close doesn't count; 85 percent is actually sort of terrifying, because the closer you get, the harder it is.

But it does seem both sides want a deal.

Both sides seem to realize that military escalation isn't really going to help either side.

So, in terms of what the deal contains, I think we have to wait until it's out.

But I'm fairly confident that the traditional red lines that Iran has posited will not be violated.

They're not going to dismantle their nuclear program.

They're not going to export all their HEU to the United States.

So we'll just have to wait and see.

But the most important fact is, it looks like there could well be an agreement to begin negotiations.

And that would be great news.

AMNA NAWAZ: Miad, what's your take on this?

Alan says close doesn't count.

Do you agree with that?

MIAD MALEKI, The Foundation for Defense of Democracies: I do.

I think here's the way that I'm looking at this.

And I'm sure you all remember during the JCPOA negotiations that we were having the same issue, that Iranians were presenting a different version of what was being negotiated or discussed than what here in D.C.

and in Washington and the U.S.

we were tracking as far as the talks.

Here are a couple of things that is very important for the Iranians as far as the text of the memorandum of understanding.

On the nuclear issue, they really want to make sure that what's being presented in the text, it's not a full-on Iran giving up its enrichment capability or no commitment to not ever being able to enrich uranium.

Listen, they have spent 900 or more billion dollars in this nuclear program.

They have been selling this to their population as a program that is going to produce electricity and gas and is going to deter foreign aggression, when, in fact, it brought the economy in Iran to where it is today and a nuclear program that is only producing less than 10 percent electricity for them.

So it is a sacred program.

They don't want to have a deal that presents it as completely being taken away from the regime.

And also on the frozen assets, I think that's another area that the Iranian regime wants that to be presented as a regime receiving these funds, or these funds being released to the regime.

On the U.S.

side, I think there's -- that's not the case.

And I think the U.S.

government only is ready to maybe restore Iran's access to these funds for humanitarian trade.

And that was the case under the Biden administration when these funds were moved to these Gulf tensions.

And that wouldn't be the releasing of funds to the regime.

And that wouldn't be a sanctions relief, because these funds are not really blocked.

They're restricted.

They can be used for non-sanctionable trade, which we did for humanitarian trade.

AMNA NAWAZ: So, Alan, I hear you saying earlier that you don't see Iran signing a deal that limits its nuclear ambitions in any way or offers any nuclear restrictions right now.

But how much of an issue is the potential for Israel's war in Lebanon to continue here?

We heard from the foreign minister in Iran, Araghchi, say that there has to be a cease-fire there.

That requires getting Bibi Netanyahu on board.

How do you see this playing out?

ALAN EYRE: Well, I must have misspoke, if you understood me to say that Iran would not accept constrictions.

They're totally willing to accept constrictions, the same constrictions they have always been willing to accept, which is, they will put limitations on their nuclear program in exchange for money, whether that's unblocking frozen assets, whether it's sanctions easing, whether it's reparations.

We will see if they're going to be able to do service charges or tolling on the Strait of Hormuz.

But you're right.

Another big spoiler here is, Iran continues to insist that the cease-fire be wide-ranging and include Lebanon.

Now, Prime Minister Netanyahu is taking a serious hit already domestically because he hasn't been able to achieve war goals that he wanted to achieve with Iran.

And if he's forced by the U.S.

administration to stand down on Lebanon and on Hezbollah leading up to an election for prime minister, that's toxic for him.

So look for Israel to be a real spoiler in terms of continuing to try to spark a military escalation with Iran.

AMNA NAWAZ: Miad, let's hear take on that and also this question of whether or not the U.S.

is better off now than it was before this war began?

Have U.S.

interests been advanced?

MIAD MALEKI: Well, just kind of reacting to what Alan said, I think one thing that is a fact about this regime is that the more the Islamic Republic fails domestically, and I would say the narrower its base of supporters become, the more it really turns outward, exporting its revolution, expanding its destabilizing influence, to really satisfy that ideological commitments that it can no longer fulfill at home, those promises that they have made to their core supporters.

And that is done through their proxy forces.

They really want to maintain Hezbollah's ability to deter Israel, to cause chaos and fear in Israel.

And it's important for them to do that.

And they can commit that it will never support proxy groups.

They have made those commitments before, but it's a covert operation, so they can do whatever they want behind closed doors in covert fashion.

So it is important, but I think at the same time they can make that commitment, yet go back to supporting Hezbollah, and that will continue to cause issues with Israel.

Now, on the kind of broader issue, whether we're better off now today, I think, again, it's the fact that the Iranian regime has been deterred militarily.

Economically, they're in very bad shape.

I have said this before.

Two, three years ago, they were setting up drones and missile facilities in our backyard in Venezuela.

Today, they're really facing significant issues domestically even keeping things together.

So the security threat has been deterred or been treated delayed for the time being, and I think that puts us in a much better position today.

AMNA NAWAZ: OK, Miad Maleki and Alan Eyre, always great to talk to you both.

Thank you so much.

ALAN EYRE: Thank you.

MIAD MALEKI: Thank you.